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TO :

FROM: Ralph Block

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The following is pertinent to our conversation this morning and is a personal statement of the matters involved in the Subcommittee's point of view:

1. SWNCC 304/1 - Psychological warfare was defined "as the planned use, during time of war or threat of war, of all means, exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given foreign group in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims . . . ."
2. SWNCC 304/1 - "There is need for the immediate establishment of a Committee with full-time representation from appropriate governmental agencies to serve as an agency charged with preparation of psychological warfare policies, plans, and studies for employment in time of war, or threat of war as determined by the President."
3. SWNCC 304/1 - Charter of the SWNCC Subcommittee on psychological warfare.

The Subcommittee shall be responsible for the:

a. Preparation of national plans and implementing directives . . .

b. Preparation of plans for orderly and effective organizational transition of the Subcommittee from peacetime to wartime status.

c. Coordination of implementation of approved plans and directives in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare.

d. Guidance and supply of necessary information including implementing requirements therefor concerning national psychological warfare plans to appropriate policy offices of State, Army, Navy and Air Force Departments and to the Director of Central Intelligence, and to authorized coordinating agencies of other departments of the government of the United States.

4. SWNCC 304/1 (Charter) - The Subcommittee shall maintain close liaison with the appropriate policy offices of the State,

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Army, Navy and Air Force Departments, and with authorized coordinating agencies of other departments of the government of the United States.

5. SANACC 304/14 - The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the pertinent Conclusions and Recommendation of SWNCC 304/6 be amended. On 7 April, at its 64th meeting, SANACC concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on SWNCC 304/6 as expressed in SANACC 304/14, and agreed to revise the Appendix.

6. The Subcommittee has had no official instruction, direct or indirect, to make any changes in its instructions beyond the JCS amendment.

The Subcommittee's mandate remains, preparation of national plans and implementing directives relating to the employment of psychological warfare, etc., which is still defined "as the planned use during time of war or threat of war, of all measures, etc."

7. The written authority of the Subcommittee has been seriously impaired at a period obviously close to possible national emergencies by the amount of vague, inconclusive information about the functions with which the Subcommittee is charged. The organizational planning for psychological warfare is only one principal part of the Subcommittee's responsibility. In order to make this planning effective in time of war, it must be keyed into and closely coordinated with logistical and other planning of the Military Establishment. This is especially true in view of the fact that all implementation of psychological warfare will be carried on in theaters of operation by Theater Commanders, with policy direction to be transmitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The inconclusiveness in which this planning now rests is due to the absence of clear and unmistakable instructions from the National Security Council on the JCS amendment, in regard to the planning for "white" propaganda which was 90% of psychological warfare operations in World War II and will be approximately the same in any future war in our time. SWNCC 304/6 noted that these elements would be required: procuring, organizing, administering, and training of personnel; procurement and distribution of supplies and equipment; preparation and distribution of psychological warfare material; research in and development of new psychological warfare methods, techniques, equipment and instruments. These are not matters which can be accomplished by waving a wand at the outbreak of war. They require careful and intensive preparation by all the Departments concerned, and such action has been seriously impaired by the indefiniteness which now surrounds this entire subject.

304/6 - In World War II the effectiveness of psychological

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warfare operations was adversely affected by:

- a. Lack of trained personnel;
- b. Lack of appreciation of the power, purposes and uses of psychological warfare;
- c. Procedural delays;
- d. Deficiencies of integration and coordination in organization.

8. In the increasing tension of world events the Subcommittee has been facing the necessity of planning for any emergency. Its Charter provides that it will be responsible for the coordination of implementation in the absence of a national wartime organization for psychological warfare. A memorandum by the Subcommittee, attached to SWNCC 304/6, drew attention to the need of planning "for immediate employment of psychological warfare considering the probable short time to mobilize". This has a direct relation to the JCS suggested amendment which draws attention to the danger to national security in the absence of planning of this kind.

In the light of the foregoing, the Subcommittee considers that it has a specific and grave responsibility and in order to assist it in carrying out this responsibility it makes, what it considers, a not unreasonable request for official clarification of its position. If no answer is forthcoming from the National Security Council, the members of the Subcommittee feel bound by the orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is the best military advice they can obtain. The Subcommittee is aware that there are other informal suggestions of methods and mechanisms for planning "white" psychological warfare, but does not consider that its responsibility is affected until its official instructions are changed, especially in view of the current international situation.